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We report the results of an experiment on the provision of a step-level collective good. 
We compare subjects’ behavior in a public good game and in a club good game. In the 
club good game, players who contribute less than the amount required to become a 
member, do not benefit from the collective good. Compared to the benchmark step-
level  public  good,  we  find  that  the  introduction  of  a  small  membership  fee  has 
surprisingly  strong  effects.  It  increases  significantly  the  provision  success  of  the 
collective good.  
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1  Introduction 
Many collective goods are provided only if a minimum contribution level is reached,  
e.g.  the  number  of  members  required  for  founding  a  club  of  a  sport,  the  NATO 
deterrence threshold, generic advertising campaign. Because of free-riding incentives, 
mechanisms  based  on  voluntary  contributions  often  fail  to  reach  the  threshold 
contribution level. The issue of under-provision becomes even more severe, whenever 
contributors have to bear the risk of a failure in the provision of the collective good. 
This happens whenever contributors are not refunded in the event where the threshold 
contribution level is not met (Money invested in NATO or in generic advertising is lost, 
time  spent  by  unsuccessful  promoters  of  a  club  is  not  refundable).  The  absence  of 
money-back  guarantee  is therefore likely to exacerbate the social dilemma faced by 
potential members of a club. To overcome the free-riding issue, a widespread practice 
consists in imposing a membership-fee for members to benefit from the collective good. 
Agents that fail to reach the fee are excluded from the benefits of the collective good. 
Those who meet the fee can enjoy the collective good whenever it is provided.  
Our main hypothesis is that the requirement of a membership-fee, even the smallest 
one, affects the subject’s perception of the contribution effort. When an agent has the 
possibility to benefit from a collective good without an effort, the agent focuses on the 
“free lunch” side. This is known as the free riding strategy. In contrast, when an agent is 
obliged to adhere in order to benefit from the collective good, the focus of the agent is 
shifted  towards  the  success  of  his  effort.  Our  aim  is  to  isolate  the  extent  to  which 
dropping the “free lunch” side of a collective good affects its success of provision. For 
that purpose, we set the adhesion fee at the smallest possible unit in our experiment so 
that  it  is  almost  costless.  We  conjecture  that  in  this  fee  setting,  subjects  contribute 
strongly whenever they decide to adhere otherwise they do not contribute.  
Few experiments have investigated the relevance of the voluntary adhesion principle for 
providing  collective  goods.  Orbell  and  Dawes  (1986)  showed  that  allowing  for  the 
option  to  adhere  or  not  to  a  prisoner  dilemma  game  improves  cooperation.  More 
recently, Swope (2002) introduced an adhesion fee in a linear public good game. He 
showed  that  average  contributions  are  increased.  However,  social  welfare  is  not 
necessarily improved. It can even be lowered when the adhesion fee is too high in a low   - 3 - 
Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) environment. Cason et al. (2004) introduced a two 
stage  game  in  a  linear  public  good  game.  Subjects  have  the  possibility  to  commit 
contributing nothing in the first stage before contributing in the second one. They found 
that free riding declines over time for spiteful motives. Boun My and Chalvignac (2009) 
introduced the possibility of exclusion in a similar two stage game for a linear public 
good game and found that it lowers the decay of average contributions over time. In our 
investigation, we tackle another issue, the relation between voluntary adhesion and the 
provision success of a step-level good. 
Our benchmark is the standard threshold public good game, which admits two Nash 
equilibria in aggregate contributions: one where none of the agents contributes to the 
public good and one where the aggregate contribution is equal to the threshold level. 
We consider a slightly modified contribution game, for which a minimum contribution 
is required to benefit from the collective good whenever it is provided. Essentially, the 
minimum contribution requirement transforms the standard public good contribution 
game into a club good contribution game. Agents who decide to contribute less than the 
minimum  requirement  are  excluded  from  the  benefits  of  the  club  good.  From  a 
theoretical  point  of  view,  the  principle  of  voluntary  adhesion  does  not  affect  the 
structure of the threshold public good game. The modified game admits the same two 
Nash equilibria than the original game. However, the set of contribution vectors which 
are compatible with the threshold level Nash equilibrium is now restricted to strictly 
positive  contribution  vectors,  where  the  smallest  value  is  precisely  equal  to  the 
minimum contribution level required for benefiting from the club good. 
Our  experimental  findings  show  that  voluntary  adhesion  increases  significantly  the 
success rate of provision with respect to the benchmark treatment. While few subjects 
provide the main effort to produce the public good yielding an unequal distribution of 
efforts, a proportion of the free riders is converted to contributors in the club good. The 
club is therefore provided with a larger number of contributing members improving the 
success of provision. However, when the free riders are not converted to contributors, 
the club fails to improve the success of provision.  
Section 2 presents a simple model of voluntary adhesion to the provision of a club 
good. Section 3 introduces our experimental design and section 4 provides a discussion   - 4 - 
about our conjectures. Section 5 presents the main results of our experiment. Section 6 
provides a discussion of the results and section 7 concludes. 
 
2  Theory  
Let G be the amount of club good provided by a group of n agents. We note gi  agent i’s 
contribution to the club good and xi = wi -gi the value of his consumption of private 
goods, where wi > 0 denotes his endowment. We assume that each agent’s utility ui(xi, 
G) is linear in both arguments: ui(xi,G) =aixi + biG, where ai is his marginal utility for 
private consumption and bi his marginal utility of the club good. We assume that ai < bi 
for all i.  
The consumption of the club good G by agent i depends on two conditions: first the 
group contribution must be large enough to meet the threshold level T, and second, if 
the first condition is met, agent i will benefit from it’s consumption only if his private 
contribution is above or equal a minimum required contribution f (f>0). In other words, 
there  is  both  a  group  threshold  contribution  level  and  an  individual  threshold 
contribution level. Both conditions must be satisfied in order for a group member to be 
able to enjoy the club good.  














otherwise. We assume that if the threshold is not met, contributions are lost, 
i.e. there is no Money Back Guarantee (MBG) mechanism. Beyond the threshold, the 
club  good  is  provided  “linearly”.  We  interpret  above  threshold  contributions  as 
improvements  of  the  club  good.  Agent  i  faces  a  social  dilemma  towards  such   - 5 - 
improvements  because  the  marginal  return  of  the  club  good  (βi)  is  inferior  to  the 
marginal return of the private good (α i ), but S bi  may be larger than αi. For instance in 
the symmetric case (α i = α ,  b i = b and wi = w for all i), kb > a  for k large enough 
n k£ < 0 . Agent i decides to adhere to the club if ui(wi-f, G) > ui(wi, 0). We summarize 
player i’s utility as follows:  
G g w G g u i i i i i i i b l a + - = ) ( ) , (     if  T G³  
) ( ) , ( i i i i i g w G g u - =a         else 
with  1 = i l  if   f gi³  
        0 = i l  if  f gi<  
 
The contribution game admits two Nash equilibria in aggregate contributions: G = T 
and G = 0. Depending on the parameter setting (n, wi, T…) the interior equilibrium G = 






, gi ≤ βT and gi > 0.  
In the symmetric case, the interior equilibrium Pareto-dominates the equilibrium where 
G = 0. Agent i chooses his contribution gi in order to maximize his utility given the 
contribution by other players, g-i. The multiple Nash contribution vectors differ with 
respect to the cost-sharing arrangement among group members to provide the step-level 
good. One obvious arrangement is sharing equally the cost (T/n) among members, but 
there are also very unequal arrangements where some of the participants “cheap ride” 
on  others’  contributions.  The  group  optimum  is  achieved  whenever  all  players 
contribute their endowment to the club, i.e. we assume n β > α.    - 6 - 
Contributing 0 can no longer be interpreted as a free riding strategy in the club good 
game since agents are excluded from the benefits. A behavior similar to free-riding 
occurs in a context of provision of club goods: there is a temptation for players to 
contribute the minimum required amount (f) to benefit from the club good. We identify 
such  behavior  as  “cheap  riding”.  In  our  experimental  setting  we  let  this  temptation 
become very strong, by setting the value of f at the minimum experimental currency 
unit, i.e 1 token. We chose the smallest possible value in order to study the principle of 
voluntary adhesion under extreme conditions.   
3  Experimental design  
Before presenting our test treatment based on the principle of voluntary adhesion, we 
start with a presentation of our reference treatment : a linear public good game with a 
threshold. In each round, subjects received an equal endowment of w = 20 tokens that 
they had to allocate (in integer amounts) between a private account and a collective 
account. The private account yielded a marginal return α = 1 per token invested. The 
collective account provided a marginal return β = 0.5 per token invested if the threshold 
level T was met. If in a given round aggregate contributions were below the target level 
T, subjects’ contributions were lost. If the group contribution was above the threshold, 
each member of the group enjoyed the total amount of the collective good provided 
above the threshold.  
The  club  good  treatments,  hereafter  called  “voluntary  adhesion  treatments”,  were 
identical to the public good treatments (baseline), except that group members who did 
not  contribute,  were  excluded  from  the  benefit  of  the  club  good  whenever  it  was 
provided. For both treatments, we compare three levels of the threshold: a low threshold   - 7 - 
(15  tokens),  medium  threshold  (30  tokens)  and  high  threshold  (60  tokens).  Each 
threshold level corresponds to a different degree of coordination difficulty. Indeed, as 
the  threshold  becomes  higher,  subjects  are  exposed  to  a  higher  risk  of  a  provision 
failure. In the low threshold, only one contributor (out of four) is required to reach the 
threshold, in the medium two contributors are needed and in the high threshold three. 
The number of contribution vectors constituting Nash equilibria is lowest in the low 
threshold and highest in the high threshold.  Finally, we assumed that contribution and 
adhesion are simultaneous in our case. Two reasons for this choice: First, it allows 
examining  voluntary  adhesion  specifically  as  just  an  option  for  exit.  In a two-stage 
game, other variables - like the information of exclusion- will interfere that are not of 
interest to our investigation. Second, it keeps it simple for subjects. Table 1 summarizes 
the parameters of the experiment. 
The experiment was run at the University of Montpellier I, with a large subject pool of 
volunteers  from  various  disciplines:  economics,  law,  art,  psychology,  literature, 
medicine,  engineering,  and  sports.  The  experiment  was  programmed  and  conducted 
with  the  software  z-Tree  (Fischbacher,  2007).  132  subjects  were  involved  in  the 
experiment. Care was taken to ensure that no subject participated in more than one 
session. A public reading of the instructions followed a private one in order to make the 
rules of the game common knowledge. Since we test whether voluntary adhesion may 
affect  the  contribution  behavior,  careful  attention  was  given  in  the  instructions  to 
prevent any design effect
3. The constituent game was repeated 25 rounds. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to groups of 4 players in a partner design. The history of the past 
interactions within each group was available to each subject at any time during the 
                                                 
3 We avoided the use of words like “invest” or “contributions” preferring words like “put”, “budget” or 
“account” in order to be neutral   - 8 - 
experiment.  The  accumulated  point  earning  over  the  25  rounds  was  converted  into 
Euros at the end of the experiment at a publicly announced rate.  
Table 1  
Experimental parameter 
(a) 
Number of contributors required to reach the threshold  ;  (b) Benefit /cost = 
T
T nb 4 ;  
4  Conjectures  
The  public  good  game  and  the  club  good  have  the  same  interior  Nash  prediction. 
However, the set of equilibrium contributions vectors of the club good game is included 
in  the  larger  set  of  equilibria  of  the  public  good  game.  There  are  therefore  fewer 
possibilities  for  coordination  failure  in  the  voluntary adhesion treatment than in the 
baseline treatment. For the low threshold the set of solution in the baseline treatment, 
i.e. the number of vectors constituting a Nash equilibrium, is equal to 23. Introducing 
voluntary adhesion drops this set of solution to 16 vectors. That is a reduction of 30.4%. 
For the medium threshold, it is reduced by 19.4% from 139 to 112. Our first conjecture 
is thus:  
                                                 
4  Since  we  are  considering  a  step  level  continuously provided above the threshold and that subjects 
homogenously  value  the  provision  of  the collective good, the step return does not vary between the 
thresholds (Croson and Marks, 2000) 








Low  15  1  6  2 
Medium  30  2  5  2  Baseline 
High  60  3  4  2 
Low  15  1  8  2 
Medium  30  2  6  2 
Voluntary  
adhesion 
High  60  3  4  2   - 9 - 
Conjecture 1: Under voluntary adhesion provision success is more likely 
than in the baseline.  
The  interior  equilibrium  of  the  public  good  game  is  compatible  with  contribution 
vectors involving one or more players who free-ride, depending on the level of the 
threshold
5. In contrast, under voluntary adhesion the number of contributing members 
at  the  interior  equilibrium  is  always  equal  to  the  number  of  players  in  the  group, 
whatever the level of the threshold. This difference entails two consequences: first, we 
expect to observe a larger number of contributing members under voluntary adhesion, 
and  second,  the  group  payoff,  called  “welfare”  thereafter,  should  be  equal  in  both 
games. Moreover, if conjecture 1 is verified, voluntary adhesion may actually lead to 
higher average welfare over rounds, because of fewer coordination failures. Our second 
conjecture is thus: 
 
Conjecture  2:  Voluntary  adhesion  leads  to  a  larger  number  of 
contributing members than in the baseline treatment, and welfare is at 
least as large than in the baseline.   
 
                                                 
5 Contribution vectors for which the group contribution is equal to the threshold and for which two or 
three players free-ride are not necessarily Nash equilibria. In the medium threshold, there exists only one 
equilibrium  contribution  vector  where  exactly  two  players  free  ride  (15,  15,  0,  0).  The  contribution 
vectors  (16, 14, 0, 0), (17, 13, 0, 0), (18, 12, 0, 0),  (19, 11, 0, 0) and (20, 10, 0, 0) are not equilibria 
because player 1 is always better off if he deviates (a similar arguments holds for the permutation of these 
vectors).  The same remark holds for the low threshold: (15, 0, 0, 0), (14, 1, 0 , 0),  (13, 2, 0 , 0), (12, 3, 0 
, 0) , (11, 4, 0 , 0),  (10, 5, 0 , 0),  (9, 6, 0 , 0),  (8, 7, 0 , 0) are not Nash equilibrium vectors. For the high 
threshold, all vectors for which the aggregate contribution is equal to the threshold are Nash equilibria. 
One player can free ride in the high threshold, i.e. the contribution vector (20, 20, 20, 0) and permutations 
of it.    - 10 - 
The contribution of 0 tokens in the public good is the free riding strategy. In the club 
contributing 0 excludes the subject. Therefore, the free riding strategy in the public 
good cannot be applied in the club. Rather, a subject contributes the minimum unit in 
order to be not excluded. We call this strategy of free riding in the club cheap riding. 
Furthermore, in the public good treatment we cannot separate free riders and subjects 
that reject the contribution to the collective good. The strategy of contributing 0 can 
indicate either a free riding behavior or a Nash expectation (coordination on the Pareto 
dominated equilibrium). However, this distinction between profiting from the effort of 
the group and just rejecting the provision becomes possible under voluntary adhesion. 
When a subject contributes 1 token to the collective account, it is cheap riding. When a 
subject does not contribute, it is the exit choice.  
As a consequence, in order to compare the strategy of free riding in the baseline to the 
cheap riding under voluntary adhesion we need to compare the proportion of free riders 
in the baseline to not only the proportion of cheap riders but also to the proportion of 
subjects that choose the option exit. We expect in this experiment to observe the same 
proportion of free riders in the baseline and in the club. Since there is no theoretical 
prediction  on  the  distribution  of  the  effort  among  subjects  of  the  same  group,  the 
proportion of free riders should remain the same.  
Conjecture  3:  The  proportion  of  free  riders  in  the  baseline  treatment 
remains the same in the voluntary adhesion.  
In  the  next  section,  we  present  the  results  of  our  experiment  with  respect  to  these 
conjectures.    - 11 - 
5  Results  
Table 2 reports a summary of our data: the average individual contribution, the average 
of strictly positive contributions and the average group contribution for each treatment 
(baseline and voluntary adhesion) and for each threshold level (low, medium and high). 
The  success  rate  of  provision  is  measured  by  the  relative  frequency  of  successful 
provision  of  the  step-level  good,  i.e.  the  number  of  periods  where  the  group 
contribution  is  at  least  equal  to  the  threshold  divided  by  the  number  of  periods. - 12 - 














(a)  The symmetrical equilibrium is 3.75 for the low threshold, 7.5 for the medium threshold and 15 tokens for the high threshold  
(b)  Group contributions / number of contributing members in the group 




































































(26.13) - 13 - 
Result 1:  Groups in the baseline and in the voluntary adhesion treatment do not 
coordinate on the Nash equilibrium.  
Groups do not coordinate significantly on the threshold in both treatments and for each level 
of threshold.  In the baseline treatment of the low threshold, only 4.82 %
6 of the provision 
success constitutes Nash equilibrium. It is 4.76 % for the voluntary adhesion treatment. The 
percentages are also weak in the medium and the high threshold: 3.33 % and 10.25% for the 
baseline, 6.25 % and 30.0 %
7 for the voluntary adhesion treatment.  
A possible explanation to this result is the rebate rule used in the experiment: a continuous 
earning above the threshold. There is no penalty or loss for overcontribution. In contrary, 
overcontribution is rewarded. Subjects are therefore encouraged to target a higher level in 
order to insure the success of provision of their group or to simply earn more tokens. Our 
finding is consisting with the previous investigation on the rebate rules of Marks and Croson 
(1998).  The  authors  showed  that  the  “utilization  rule”  increases  the  variance  of  group 
contributions around a threshold. Since in our design the incentive for overcontribution is 
higher than the experiment of Marks and Croson (1998)
8, the low level of group coordination 
around the threshold is therefore more likely to happen. Our result confirms the previous 
findings of the authors.  
                                                 
6 Percentage of Nash equilibria = Number of Nash equilibria / Number of times group contributions reach at 
least the threshold 
7 In 100 trials, subjects succeeded 30 times to reach the threshold. 9 out of these 30 successes constitute Nash 
equilibrium.  
8  The payoff of the collective account is twofold: it is decomposed in a constant payoff for just reaching the 
threshold and a lower marginal return for overcontributiuon. Our design is rather similar to the one used by Isaac 
and Walker  (1989) with a same marginal return between reaching the threshold and overcontribution.  - 14 - 
Result 2: Voluntary adhesion significantly increases the success of provision.  
Introducing voluntary adhesion improves the success of provision for both threshold levels: 
low and medium. The success of provision is improved by 32.2% in the voluntary adhesion 
treatment  of the low threshold with respect to the baseline and by 28.0% in the medium 
threshold. Visual inspection of average group contributions over time also shows a higher 
curve  in  the  voluntary  adhesion  treatment  for  both  levels  of  threshold  (figures  1  and  2). 
Clearly, voluntary adhesion leads to a higher success of provision.  
Support for result 2 
The 
2 c  test confirms that provision success is significantly larger under voluntary adhesion 
for the low threshold (
2 c =36.86; p<0.01) and for the medium threshold (
2 c =22.33; p<0.01) 
with  respect  to  the  baseline  treatment.  A  logit  panel  data  regression  with  random  effects 
confirms the results of the non-parametric test. The binary dependent variable takes value 1 if 
the  group  contribution  is  larger  or  equal  to  the  threshold  and  0  otherwise.  We  take  as 
explanatory variables the Voluntary adhesion dummy (1 for adhesion and 0 for the baseline), 
and  the  round  number  (Period).  Table  3  reports  the  results.  Voluntary  adhesion  has  a 
significantly positive effect on provision success. There is a slight decline of the success of 
provision over time. This finding is consistent with the traditional decay of contributions in 
experiments on public goods.  
It is remarkable to point out that just adding the possibility for adhesion to subjects improves 
dramatically the success of provision. The level of improvement is comparable to an incentive 
as strong as refunding contributions when the provision point is not met
9 (also called Money 
                                                 
9 We conducted the same experiment with money back guarantee for both threshold levels. We obtain the same 
level  of  provision  success:  80.0%  in the low (73.5.% under voluntary adhesion) and 69.3% in the medium - 15 - 
Back Guarantee, see Isaac and Walker (1989)). The refund acts as an assurance mechanism. It 
drops  the  risk  of  loss  associated  to  the  coordination  failure.  Voluntary  adhesion  acts 
differently. It facilitates coordination. We discuss this issue in Result 4. 
Table 3  
Panel data regression for provision success (low and medium threshold 
(a)) 
Regressors  T=15  T=30 
Intercept  1.34 (*) 
(1.74) 
-- 








     
Log likelihood  -153.27  -164.78 
     
Number of observation  350  275 
Number of groups  14  11 
Time periods  25  25 
(***):  significant at 1% level; (**): significant at 5% level; (*): significant at 10% level; -- non significant; (a): 
T-statistics are in parentheses  
                                                                                                                                                          
(67.7% under voluntary adhesion). There is no statistical difference between the two success of provision results. 
Low ( χ
2
=2.00 ; p=0.15) Medium ( χ
2
=0.07 ; p=0.77). 
 - 16 - 
Figure 1: Average group contributions (T=15)
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At least two subjects to reach the threshold
Medium threshold
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Result 3: Voluntary adhesion increases the number of contributing members and 
improves welfare.  
We define a contributing member as a subject who contributes a strictly positive amount to 
the collective good. Table 4 depicts the average proportion of periods for each number of 
contributing member per group for the low and the medium threshold. In 79% of the periods 
in  the  voluntary  adhesion  treatment  of  the  low  threshold,  the  four  members  of  a  group 
contribute to the collective good. This happens only in 17% of the periods in the baseline 
treatment.  In the medium threshold the 4 members of the group contribute in 77% of the 
periods while this happens only in 26% of the periods in the baseline treatment. Clearly, 
voluntary adhesion increases dramatically the number of contributing members.  
Table 4: Average proportion of periods for each number of contributing members per group(*)  
Number  of 
contributing 
members per group 
Low  Medium 
  Baseline  Voluntary 
adhesion  Baseline  Voluntary 
adhesion 
0  28%  3%  14%  3% 
         
1  19%  2%  13%  3% 
         
2  19%  4%  19%  5% 
         
3  17%  14%  28%  13% 
         
4  17%  79%  26%  77% 
         
  100%  100%  100%  100% 
 
(*) Number of contributing members per group by period / total number of periods - 18 - 
 
Support for result 3 
We run a panel data regression
10 where the number of contributing members per group is 
taken  as  the  dependent  variable.    The  explanatory  variables  are  the  Voluntary  adhesion 
dummy  and  the  round  number  (Period).  Table  5  reports  the  results  of  the  regression. 
Voluntary  adhesion  has  a  significant  and  positive  effect  on  the  number  of  contributing 
members in the low and the medium threshold. The number of contributing members is 
increased by 2 in the low threshold and by 1 in the medium threshold.  
Table 5  
Results from panel data regressions explaining the number of contributing members per group for each 
level of threshold 
(a) 
















     
R2(overall)  50.14%  27.86% 
     
Number of observation  350  275 
Number of groups  14  11 
Time periods  25  25 
 
(***):   significant at 1% level; (**): significant at 5% level; (*): significant at 10% level; -- non significant; (a) : 
T-statistics are in parentheses  
                                                 
10 We also perform a χ
2 test comparison. It shows an increase of the number of contributors in the low (χ
2 = 
153.31; p<0.01) and in the medium threshold (χ
2 = 67.28; p<0.01).  - 19 - 
Our conjecture 2 states that welfare in the voluntary adhesion is at least as large as in the 
baseline. We take as indicator the total group payoff. On average subjects earn 11.46€ in the 
baseline treatment and 12€.35 in the voluntary adhesion treatment for the low threshold, a 
significant difference (U-test = -3.30 ; p<0.01). Similarly in the medium threshold subjects 
earn an average of 11.16€ in the baseline and 12.52€ in the voluntary adhesion treatment (U-
test = - 2.30 ; p=0.02). Conjecture 2 is therefore confirmed: voluntary adhesion improves 
subject’s payoff.  
Result 4: All the free riders in the baseline treatment are not converted to cheap 
riders in the voluntary adhesion treatment.  
Our  experiment  shows  that  the  proportion  of  free  riders  in  the  baseline  decreases  in  the 
voluntary adhesion treatment. There is a peak of free riding in the baseline treatment while a 
lower  focus  on  cheap  riding  by  subjects  of  the  voluntary  adhesion  treatment.  In  the  low 
threshold,  56.33%  of  the  amounts  contributed  are  0  tokens  and  40.27%  in  the  medium 
threshold. Under voluntary adhesion, there is a less marked distribution for 0 and 1 token 
contributed: only 9.13% and 22.88% in the low and 11.82% and 8.62% in the medium. That 
is 24.32% (low) and 19.83% (medium) of the free riders in the baseline have changed their 
behavior  in  the  club.  Thus,  our  conjecture  3  is  rejected:  we  do  not  observe  the  same 
proportion  of  free  riders  in  the  baseline  and  the  voluntary  adhesion  treatment.  Moreover 
figure shows that free riders are converted we observe that the high level  
Support for result 4 
This result is first confirmed by a non-parametric 
2 c  test: there is a significant difference 
between the proportion of free riders in the baseline (contribution 0 token) and the proportion 
of  auto-excluded  subjects  (contribution  0)  +  cheap  riders  (contribution  1  token)  in  the 
voluntary  adhesion  treatment  (
2 c =83.10  ;  p-value<0.01  in  the  low  and
2 c =49.85  ;  p-- 20 - 
value<0.01 in the medium). Second, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows the existence of a 
different  distribution  of  the  tokens  contributed  to  the  collective  account  in  the  two 
treatments
11  (D=0.4720  ;  p-value  <0.01  in  the  low  and  D=0.2853  ;  p-value<0.01  for  the 
medium threshold).  
Thus, this finding supports result 3. There is a higher level of contributing members under 
voluntary adhesion. Part of these contributing members comes from the conversion of free 
riders in the baseline treatment.  
Result 5: Average contribution per contributing member is significantly lower in 
voluntary adhesion treatment than in the baseline.  
The collective investment of a contributing member in the voluntary adhesion is significantly 
lower than the one of a contributing member in the baseline treatment. Table 2 points out this 
finding: in the low threshold a contributing member invests 2.53 tokens more in the baseline 
(2.09 tokens in the medium threshold) than under voluntary adhesion.  
This difference is statistically significant (U=2.99; p-value<0.01 and U=3.77; p-value<0.01). 
This result is also found when we consider only the cases of the success of provision in the 
two treatments (U=5.79 ; p-value<0.01 and U=5.25 ;p-value<0.01). Note that the lower level 
of  individual  contribution  in  the  voluntary  adhesion  treatment  is  not  correlated  to  the 
existence of a higher number of contributing members in the group (Cf. Result 3). Indeed, the 
group contribution in the voluntary adhesion treatment is significantly different than in the 
baseline (U=-5.71 ; p-value<0.01 for the low and U=-3.32; p-value<0.01 for the medium).  
Hence, the collective contribution in the club is different on two aspects with respect to the 
baseline: first we observe more subjects contributing in the group. Second, subjects contribute 
less. But, as members in a group under voluntary adhesion are numerous to contribute they 
                                                 
11 Figure 5 and 6 in the appendix depicts the distribution of amounts contributed to the collective account.  - 21 - 
reach a higher level of success of provision. That is in the baseline treatment, a few generous 
individuals  provide  the  public  good  whereas  in  the  voluntary  adhesion  treatment  all  the 
subjects  provides  the  club  good  but  with  less  individual  effort.  Figure  3  illustrates  this 
modification  of  subjects’  collective  contribution  under  voluntary  adhesion.  It  depicts  the 
decumulated frequency of the contributing members to the collective account. It shows that 
for  each  level  of  contribution  there  is  a  higher  frequency  of  observation  in  the  baseline 
treatment than in the voluntary adhesion treatment. 
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Result  6:  In  the  high  threshold,  there  is  no  significant  difference  between  the 
baseline  treatment  and  the  voluntary  adhesion  treatment.  There  is  however  a 
lower welfare under voluntary adhesion.  
In the high threshold, group contributions in the baseline and the voluntary adhesion treatment 
do not reach the threshold level on average. Besides, neither the baseline nor the voluntary 
adhesion treatment perform significantly better. Both treatments reach the same average level 
of  group  contributions.  Introducing  the  principle  of  voluntary  adhesion  is  therefore  not 
sufficient to improve the success of provision in the high threshold. While in the low and the 
medium threshold just allowing for an exit dramatically improves the success of provision, 
this is not the case for the high threshold.  
Support for result 6 
Figure  4  depicts  average  group  contributions  over  time  for  the  high  threshold.  A  visual 
inspection clearly shows that group contributions do not reach the threshold. It is confirmed 
by a unilateral T test for the baseline (t = -9.32 ; p-value<0.01) and (t = -12.01 ; p-value<0.01) 
for  the  voluntary  adhesion  treatment.  Figure  4  also  shows  that  there  are  no  significant 
differences  between  the success rate in the baseline and the voluntary adhesion treatment 
(
2 c =1.79; p=0.18) and group contributions (U=1.27 ; p=0.20).   
The  low  success  of  provision  found  for  the  high  threshold  is  consistent  with  previous 
experimental results on threshold goods without refunding. (Bougherara et al., 2007; Dawes 
et al., 1986; Isaac et al., 1989; Suleiman and Rapoport, 1992). A possible explanation is that 
subjects face a high risk of provision failure. The threshold level requires a costly effort from 
the members of a group: three endowments out of four are needed to reach the threshold. 
Another example, the symmetrical Nash equilibrium, a focal point, is to contribute 75% of the 
endowment  of  each  member.  Besides,  there  is  no  refund  of  contributions  whenever  the - 23 - 
threshold is not met. As a consequence, small departures from equilibrium contributions entail 
costly loss for the members of the group who try to reach the provision point. Subjects stop 
therefore coordinating around the threshold.   
In addition to this high risky level of threshold, we observe this time the same number of 
contributing  members  in  the  baseline  and  the  voluntary  adhesion  treatment  for  the  high 
threshold  (U=6.26  ;  p-value=0.18).    At  the  difference  of  the  low  and  medium  threshold, 
voluntary adhesion did not increase the number of contributing members. This may explain 
the  failure  of  the  voluntary  adhesion  as  an  incentive  for  the  high  threshold.  Besides,  our 
finding shows that such incentive can lower subject’s payoff. We observe a higher payoff in 
the  baseline  treatment  than  in  the  voluntary  adhesion  treatment  (U=2.72;  p-value<0.01). 
Giving the option of auto-exclusion can be at the end inefficient for high threshold levels.  
6  Discussion  
It is a remarkable result that just dropping the free aspect of a step level collective good can 
dramatically improve the success of provision while the theoretical predictions remain the 
same.  Under  voluntary  adhesion,  the  success  of  provision  increases  by  32.2%  in  the  low 
threshold and 28.0% for the medium threshold. This improvement of the success of provision 
is not obtained by a higher individual contribution. In contrary, a contributing member invests 
significantly less under voluntary adhesion with respect to the contributing members of the 
baseline treatment (Cf. Result 4). We could expect that subjects in the club would keep the 
same level of contribution to the one of the baseline treatment or even increase it. This is not 
the case. The contributing members of the group contribute less but as they are numerous to 
provide the collective good, they provide a higher investment in the collective account and 
obtain therefore a better level of success of provision.  - 24 - 
The Nash prediction can explain the higher number of contributing members (Cf. conjecture 
2). All the equilibrium are made of the 4 players of the group. But the Nash prediction states a 
same Pareto-dominant equilibrium for both treatments. It does not explain therefore the better 
success  of  provision  observed  under  voluntary  adhesion.  Our  findings  suggest  rather  the 
existence of a relation between the reductions of the set of the solution and the coordination 
issue.  As  stated  in  conjecture  1,  voluntary  adhesion  reduces  the  set  of  the  solution  for 
players
12. It seems that the more the reduction of the set is important the more likely the 
success of provision will be important. Indeed, the most effective results are observed first 
with the low threshold, then with the medium threshold and finally with the high threshold.  
However, the experiment also reveals that dropping the free aspect of a high level of threshold 
is not sufficient to improve the success of provision. In contrary, it decreases the welfare by 
excluding  subjects.  A  possible  explanation  is  that  we  observe  the  same  number  of 
contributing members on both treatments in this case. It seems that the reduction of only 
XXX% of the number of contributions vectors in a risky environment is not sufficient to 
improve coordination. Further investigation on the relation between the reduction of the set of 
the solution and the facilitation of the coordination effort is required
13. 
Conclusion 
We aim to investigate the relation between the option of voluntary adhesion and the success 
of provision. Allowing for voluntary adhesion drops the free aspect of a collective good. It is 
a club good when there is an option for exit and a public good else. For that purpose we set an 
experiment  where  voluntary  adhesion  is  almost  costless.  We  compare  three  levels  of 
                                                 
12 The problem faced by our player is close to the tacit coordination experiment of Van Huyck et al. (1990) but 
in a context of non-Pareto ranked equilibria. 
13 See the investigation of the same authors on this issue.  - 25 - 
threshold,  each  time  with  and  without  voluntary  adhesion.  There  are  few  theoretical 
differences  between  theses  two  games.  In  particular,  the  equilibrium  in  aggregate  group 
contributions remains the same, providing exactly the threshold.  
Our  experiment  reveals  that  voluntary  adhesion  significantly  increases  the  success  of 
provision  and  welfare  (except  for  the  high  threshold)  while  it  decreases  the  effort  of 
contributing members. These results suggest that a few generous subjects contribute the bulk 
of the group contributions in the public good treatment. However, in the voluntary adhesion 
treatment the effort to provide the threshold is more fairly distributed among the subjects.  A 
possible explanation to our result is the decrease of the set of the contribution vectors of Nash 
equilibrium. This decrease percentage is maximal when the threshold is low. This is also the 
most effective setting in our experiment. Voluntary adhesion is an incentive to decrease the 
coordination failure.   - 26 - 
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